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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently issued Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union1 which upheld Runyon v. McCrary2 and the no-
tion that Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is applicable to private contracts.
However, this same opinion substantially limited the application of
section 1981 to employment discrimination cases through a strict read-
ing of the statute.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor and Scalia, J.J., joined. Justice
Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part, which Marshall and Blackmun, J.J., joined, and in parts II-B, II-C, and III of
which Stevens, J., joined. Justice Stevens also filed a separate opinion concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
2. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of the laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind and no other.
3
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted section 1981 to
prohibit race discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
employment contracts in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.4
Since Johnson, employment discrimination claims under section 1981
have become common-place.5 However, it has never been clear how
far the protections of section 1981 extend in employment contract situ-
ations. Johnson did very little to define what type of employment con-
duct was actionable under section 1981.6 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court only addressed the meaning of section of 1981 on four occasions
between Johnson and Patterson.7 These opinions also did little to de-
fine the reach of section 1981.
The lack of a clear interpretation of section 1981 as it relates to
employment discrimination has led to confusion among the lower fed-
eral courts. This confusion increased following the Supreme Court's
decision in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.8 The majority opinion in
Goodman did not discuss the contractual rights protected by section
1981.9 However, the dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun indicated that some members of the Court favored a strict
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
4. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The Court held that
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981... on its face relates primarily to racial discrimina-
tion in the making and enforcing of contracts. Although this court has
not specifically so held, it is well settled among the federal Courts of
Appeals - and now we join them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy
against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.
Id. at 459-60.
5. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Fifty employment discrimination
claims involving section 1981 have been finally adjudicated in the Eighth Circuit
since January 1, 1985.
6. The issue in Johnson was whether the timely filing of an employment discrimina-
tion charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission tolled the stat-
ute of limitations period for section 1981 claims. Therefore, it was unnecessary
for the Court to define the types of actionable employment discrimination.
7. See Saint Francis College v. Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022
(1987)(§ 1981 may prohibit discrimination against Arabs); Shaare Tefila Congre-
gation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987)(§ 1981 may prohibit discrimination against
Jews); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)(no
liability under § 1981 absent intentional discrimination); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)(§ 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in pri-
vate employment against whites as well as nonwhites).
8. 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987)
9. The Court was deciding the appropriate statute of limitations period for section
1981 actions, not the protections allowed under the statute.
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interpretation of section 1981.10 This strict interpretation became a
reality with the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union.1 1
This note analyzes the holding in Patterson; provides a survey of
the number and type of section 1981 claims in the Eighth Circuit since
January 1, 1985; and finally examines how Patterson would have af-
fected the three successful section 1981 claims in the Eighth Circuit.
II. FACTS OF PATTERSON
Brenda Patterson, a black woman, was employed by McLean
Credit Union for approximately ten years as a teller and a file coordi-
nator. In July 1982, McLean terminated Patterson, prompting her to
file a claim for employment discrimination under section 1981.12 Pat-
terson claimed that McLean "harassed her, failed to promote her to an
intermediate accounting clerk position and terminated her, all because
of her race."13 Patterson also filed a state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on this same conduct.14
The district court ruled that racial harassment in the workplace is
not actionable under section 1981.15 A jury then ruled against Patter-
son on her discriminatory discharge claim as well as on her claim that
McLean had failed to promote her because of her race.16 Finally, the
district court directed a verdict for McLean on the intentional inflic-
10. Justice Brennan stated that
Section 1981, in its original conception and its current application, is
primarily a proscription of race discrimination in the execution, adminis-
tration, and enforcement of contracts...
The general obligation to treat all persons with equal dignity undeni-
ably prohibits discrimination based on race. Yet that obligation is still
imposed in a legal system that classifies obligations based on contract
and those based on the reasonable persons duty of care. Section 1981
actions were primarily intended to, and most often do, vindicate claims
which are related to contractual rights.
Id. at 2625, 2631.
11. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
13. Patterson testified that
[her supervisor] periodically stared at her for several minutes at a time;
that he gave her too many tasks, causing her to complain that she was
under too much pressure; that among the tasks given her were sweeping
and dusting, jobs not given to white employees. On one occasion, she
testified, [her supervisor] told [her] that blacks are known to work
slower than whites. According to [petitioner, her supervisor] also criti-
cized her in staff meetings while not similarly criticizing white
employees.
Id- at 2373 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th
Cir. 1986)).
14. Id. at 2369.
15. Id
16. Id
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tion of emotional distress claim.17
Patterson raised two issues in her appeal to the Fourth Circuit:
first, that the district court erred in refusing to submit her racial har-
assment claim to the jury; second, that the jury instruction on her dis-
criminatory failure to promote claim was erroneous.1 8 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision on both issues.19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether racial harassment is actionable under section 1981, and
whether the district court's jury instruction on the promotion claim
was correct.20 The Court then ordered the parties to brief and to ar-
gue whether Runyon v. McCrary2 l should be overturned. 22
III. HOLDING IN PATTERSON
The United States Supreme Court upheld Runyon 23 and reaf-
firmed that section 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making
and enforcement of private contracts." 24 The Court based its decision
on stare decisis grounds.25 Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion,
agreed that Runyon should be upheld, but he felt the Court's reason-
ing was incorrect. Instead, Brennan argued that the Court should
have found Runyon correct as an initial matter and that Congress had
ratified Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 by not taking legisla-
tive action to overrule that interpretation.26
The Court also held that racial harassment occurring during em-
ployment is not actionable under section 1981 because it occurs after
17. The district court held that "the employer's conduct did not rise to the level of
outrageousness required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under applicable standards of North Carolina law." Id.
18. The district court instructed the jury "that in order to prevail on her § 1981 claim
of discriminatory failure to promote, she must show that she was better qualified
than the white employee who she alleges was promoted in her stead." Id
19. On the racial harassment claim the court of appeals held that
claims of racially discriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion go to the
very existence and nature of the employment contract and thus fall eas-
ily within § 1981's protection. Instances of racial harassment, on the
other hand, may implicate the terms and conditions of employment
under Title VII... and of course may be probative of the discriminatory
intent required to be shown in a § 1981 action... but, standing alone,
racial harassment does not abridge the right to "make" and "enforce"
contracts - including personal service contracts - conferred by § 1981.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (4th Cir. 1986).
20. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 484 U.S. 814 (1988).
21. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
22. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
23. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's deci-
sion to uphold Runyon.
24. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2379-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the formation of the employment contract. According to Patterson,
section 1981's right to make contracts "extends only to the formation
of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the condi-
tions of continuing employment."2 7 Justice Brennan dissented from
this part of the opinion arguing that the legislative history of section
1981 indicates that the statute should not be interpreted so narrowly.28
Brennan would hold that racial harassment which is "severe or perva-
sive" enough to show that the contract was not entered into in a ra-
cially neutral manner is actionable under section 1981.29
The second right protected by section 1981 is the same right to en-
force contracts. The Court held that this protection simply extends to
"a right of access to legal process, that will address and resolve con-
tract-law claims without regard to race."30 This narrow interpretation
also fails to provide relief to victims of racial harassment.
The Court justified the narrow interpretation of section 1981 by
saying that racial harassment is actionabfe under Title VII.31 Yet, Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent points out the differences between section 1981
and Title VII and argues that the two protections can coexist.3 2
Finally, the Court held that discriminatory promotion claims are
actionable under section 1981 if the promotion would have created a
sufficient change in position to involve the opportunity to enter into a
new contract. Justices Brennan and Stevens in their dissents state
that all promotion claims should be actionable if the employee can
prove he or she was better qualified than the white employee who was
promoted.33
IV. ANALYSIS OF PATTERSON
A. Section 1981 Extends to Private Contracts
In Runyon the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohib-
ited private schools from excluding qualified children solely on the
basis of race.3 4 The Runyon opinion solidified the notion that section
1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of private contracts." 35 However, it appeared that this settled rule was
in jeopardy when the Court in Patterson, on its own initiative, ordered
the parties to argue whether Runyon should be overturned. This al-
most unprecedented move by the Court created substantial contro-
27. Id at 2372 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id at 2388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. IM at 2389 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id at 2373.
31. Id- at 2374-75.
32. I& at 2391 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Id at 2395 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
35. Id.
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versy among legal scholars and civil rights activists.3 6
While this Note does not focus extensively on the reasons for up-
holding Runyon,37 a brief discussion of the decision to uphold Runyon
is important. Patterson held that Runyon should not be overturned
and that "§ 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of private contracts."38 The Court based its decision on
stare decisis grounds after finding that there was no special justifica-
tion for overruling Runyon because the decision has not been under-
mined by subsequent developments in the law, the holding is not
unworkable or confusing, and the holding in Runyon is still consistent
with the sense of prevailing justice in this country.3 9
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that the Court's decision "to
adhere to the principle of stare decisis . .. could readily and would
better have been made before the Court decided to put Runyon and its
progeny into question by ordering reargument in this case."4 0 Fur-
thermore, Brennan felt that the Court's decision "glosses over.., two
very obvious reasons for refusing to overrule this interpretation of
§ 1981: that Runyon was correctly decided, and that in any event Con-
gress has ratified our construction of the statute."4' Again, these justi-
fications have been extensively considered 42 and this Note will not
discuss them further. The important consideration is that Runyon
was not overruled and that private contracts are protected by section
1981.
36. Justice Brennan summed up the concerns when he stated:
Runyon is entirely consonant with our society's deep commitment to the
eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of her
skin.... In the past, this Court has overruled decisions antagonistic to
our Nation's commitment to the ideal of a society in which a person's
opportunities do not depend on her race ... and I find it disturbing that
the Court has in this case chosen to reconsider, without any request from
the parties, a statutory construction so in harmony with that ideal.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2380 (1989) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
37. For a complete discussion on the importance of Runyon see Aleinikoff, Patterson
v. McLean" Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988); Es-
kridge, Patterson v. McLean: Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. RErv.
67 (1988); Farber, Patterson v. McLean: Statutory Interpretation, Legislative In-
action, and Civil Rights, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2 (1988); Livingston & Marcosson, The
Court at the Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37
EMORY L.J. 949 (1988); Maltz, Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case, 87
McH. L. REv. 858 (1989).
38. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989).
39. Id. at 2370-71.
40. Id. at 2380 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Id- (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. See supra note 37.
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B. The Same Right to Make Contracts
The Patterson Court construed section 1981 very narrowly. The
Court stated that section 1981 "forbid[s] discrimination in the
'mak[ing] and enforce[ment]' of contracts alone."43 A similarly re-
strictive definition was then given to the words "making" and
"enforcement."
The right to make contracts, according to Patterson, "extends only
to the formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later
from the conditions of continuing employment."44 This interpretation
if applied literally should eliminate many section 1981 claims.45 All
racial harassment claims based on conduct that occurred after the for-
mation of the contract should be eliminated by the Court's interpreta-
tion of the statute.46 Subsequent decisions of the majority of lower
federal courts have demonstrated such a result.47
A literal reading of the statute would also appear to eliminate all
discriminatory discharge claims because a discharge by its very defini-
tion must occur after the formation of the contract. The Fifth,48
Ninth,49 Eleventh,50 and most recently Seventh 51 Circuit Courts of
Appeals have all endorsed this literal reading, thus barring discrimi-
natory discharge claims under section 1981. Additionally, the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska was one of the first
courts to hold that section 1981 no longer applied to discriminatory
discharge claims. In Young v. Control Data Corp.,52 the plaintiff filed
two claims after the defendant terminated her employment. The first
involved alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the second claim alleged that the defend-
ant violated section 1981 by disciplining her during her employment
43. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (1989).
44. Id.
45. Justice Stevens in his dissent predicted that the majority's reading of section 1981
would limit the applicability of the statute to situations where the employee
could "demonstrate that the employer intended to discourage her from taking the
job" or where "the employer actually intended to enter into a contract but 'only
on discriminatory terms.'" Id. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
46. 1i at 2374 ("This type of conduct, reprehensible though it may be if true, is not
actionable under § 1981, which covers only conduct at the initial formation of the
contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations
through legal process.")
47. See Matthews v. Freedman, 882 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1989); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,
881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F.
Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1989).
48. Carroll v. General Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1990).
49. Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
50. Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).
51. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. No. CV. 87-0-314 (D. Neb. 1989)(order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
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and later discharging her, all because of her race.5 3
After the Supreme Court issued Patterson, the defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment based on the Court's interpretation of
section 1981. The district court granted the motion, holding that the
plaintiff's section 1981 claim was based on conduct that occurred after
the formation of the contract and that based on Patterson the statute
"does not extend to conduct by the employer after the contract rela-
tion has been established."5 4
As the previous discussion demonstrates, the majority of the fed-
eral courts have read Patterson literally and held that discriminatory
discharge no longer fits within the language of section 1981. However,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently became the first circuit
to hold that discriminatory discharge claims are still actionable under
section 1981. In Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc.,55 the court established
that Patterson only addressed racial harassment and "did not address
whether discriminatory discharge is actionable under either the right
to make or the right to enforce contracts."5 The court went on to
conclude that "discriminatory discharge goes to the very existence and
nature of the employment contract. A discriminatory discharge com-
pletely deprives the employee of his or her employment, the very es-
sence of the right to make employment contracts."'57 The court then
concluded that "in order to give meaning to the right to make con-
tracts free from discrimination, the right to be free from discrimina-
tory discharge must be implied."58
Hicks was obviously an attempt to avoid the harsh results of Pat-
terson. However, the plain language of section 1981 and Patterson
make it apparent that the Eighth Circuit extended the application of
section 1981 beyond that intended by the Supreme Court. This fact
becomes even more obvious when the other cases interpreting Patter-
53. Defendant's Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
5, Young v. Control Data Corp., No. CV. 87-0-314 (D. Neb. 1989). (Young did not
raise a Title VII race claim during the administrative process. She raised the
section 1981 race claim after receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC.)
54. Young v. Control Data Corp., No. CV. 87-0-314 (D. Neb. 1989)(order granting de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment).
55. 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990).
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id. at 639.
58. Id. See also Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp 485 (D. Colo. 1989), where
the court held
termination is part of the making of a contract. A person who is termi-
nated because of his race, like one who was denied an employment con-
tract because of his race, is without a job. Termination affects the
existence of the contract, not merely the terms of its performance. Thus,
discriminatory termination directly affects the right to make a contract
contrary to § 1981.
Id. at 490. But see Morgan v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 720 F. Supp. 758
(W.D. Mo. 1989); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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son are analyzed. The district court's opinion in Young5 9 is the correct
interpretation of Patterson. However, the federal district courts in the
Eighth Circuit, including the court which issued Young, will be forced
to abandon that case in favor of Hicks.
C. The Same Right to Enforce Contract
Based on section 1981 all employees also have "the same right...
to... enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 60 Patter-
son held that this right "embraces protection of a legal process, and of
a right of access to legal process, that will address and resolve con-
tract-law claims without regard to race." 61 The court also stated that
"the right to enforce contracts does not extend beyond conduct by an
employer which impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal
process his or her established contract rights."62 This narrow inter-
pretation indicates that the statute will only be applicable in limited
situations. The example given by the Court is that "certain private
entities such as labor unions, which bear explicit responsibilities to
process grievances, press claims, and represent members in disputes
over the terms of binding obligations that run from employer to the
employee, are subject to liability under § 1981 for racial discrimina-
tion."63 Such liability would arise in situations where the labor union
refuses to file a grievance for a minority employee or if the labor
union refuses to enforce other terms of a labor contract because of the
person's race.
The Court's interpretation of the "same right to enforce" language
does not provide any hope for employees bringing discriminatory dis-
charge and racial harassment claims. However, this language has been
interpreted by one court to allow section 1981 retaliatory discharge
claims. In Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co. 4, the defendant filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment based on Patterson. The defendant ar-
gued that because of Patterson, section 1981 no longer provided a
remedy for post-formation racial harassment, discriminatory demo-
tion and retaliatory discharge claims.
The district court held that Patterson does bar racial harassment
and discriminatory demotion claims.65 However, the court stated:
The right to enforce contracts extends to private efforts to obstruct nonjudi-
cial methods of adjudicating disputes involving discrimination. Plaintiff al-
leges that he was retaliated against because he complained of discrimination
and instigated an investigation regarding his charges. These allegations fall
59. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 for a discussion of Young.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
61. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 716 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989).
65. Id at 1368.
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within the coverage afforded by the right to enforce contracts in § 1981.66
Therefore, according to the district court, an employee's claim that he
was discharged because he filed a discrimination claim with a govern-
ment agency is actionable under section 1981.
However, in Sherman v. Burke Contracting,6 7 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an employee's claim that he was termi-
nated for filing an EEOC complaint was not actionable because the
complaint "did not relate to any right created by his employment con-
tract."68 The Sherman court stated, however, that section 1981 would
apply to retaliatory conduct "when the employer aims to prevent or
discourage an employee from using legal process to enforce a specific
contract right."69
D. Promotion Claims
In Patterson, the Court addressed two issues relating to discrimina-
tory promotion claims. The first of these issues is whether discrimina-
tory promotion claims are actionable under section 1981. Patterson
held that such claims are actionable. However, the Court stated that
section 1981 does not cover all discriminatory promotion claims, only
those claims where "the nature of the change in position was such that
it involved the opportunity to enter into a new contract." 70
Patterson does not indicate how substantial the change in position
must be before a discriminatory promotion claim can be brought
under section 1981. Furthermore, this limitation raises questions
about the actionability of claims that an employee was transferred to a
different department for discriminatory reasons or that an employee
was transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary for discriminatory rea-
sons.71 The Court's failure to explain this limitation makes it impossi-
66. Id at 1368-69.
67. 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 1535.
69. Id. See Mcknight v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 104, 112 (7th Cir. 1990)(relied on
Sherman to hold that retaliatory discharge claim was not actionable and also
stated that termination for attempting to collect wages due, to enforce pension
rights, or to enforce a "just cause" or seniority rights provision in a collective
bargaining agreement would be actionable because these are the types of specific
contract rights covered by the language of the statute).
70. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 (1989).
71. In McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990), the court pro-
vided some guidance on this issue when it stated, "[a] transfer between divisions
of a company does not automatically create a new employment relation either.
Conceivably, if the two divisions are unrelated and the employee's jobs in the
division are significantly different, the transfer might... count as the creation of
a new employment relationship." Id. at 110. The court went on to state that
the transfer of an executive from the accounting to the manufacturing
division in the same plant is not of this character. Such job changes are
part of the ordinary progression of a business executive in his career
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ble to answer these questions with certainty and it is possible that the
limitation will prove to be meaningless, but the questions referred to
above should be kept in mind. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, appar-
ently felt that the limitation would have a minor impact. He noted his
displeasure with the limitation but said that "[ilt is admittedly difficult
to see how a 'promotion'-which would seem to imply different duties
and employment terms-could be achieved without a new contract,
and it may well be as a result that promotion will always be cognizable
under § 1981."72
However, it appears that the courts are not going to hold that every
promotion is sufficient to create a new contract. In Greggs v. Hillman
Distributing Co.,73 the court held that a promotion from sales supervi-
sor to area supervisor did not itself create a new contract. The court
held that the plaintiff had to establish that the promotion "would have
resulted in a new contract-a 'new and distinct relation'-had such a
promotion occurred."74
The second promotion issue in Patterson was whether the district
court's jury instruction on the discriminatory promotion claim was
correct. The Court held that the district court erred when it in-
structed the jury that Patterson had to prove she was better qualified
than the white employee who received the promotion. 5 In order for
an employee to establish a discriminatory promotion claim he or she
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by proving "by a
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for and was qualified
for an available position, that she was rejected, and that after she was
rejected respondent either continued to seek applicants for the posi-
tion, or ... filled the position with a white employee."7 6 The employer
is then given the opportunity to show that the employee was not cho-
sen because of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.77 If the em-
ployer can make such a showing then the employee must be given the
opportunity to show that the reasons were pretextual. 7s
According to the Supreme Court, the district court's instruction
that Patterson had to prove she was better qualified than the white
employee who received the job was error. The Court stated that sev-
eral methods can be used to prove that an employer's alleged legiti-
with a company and it would be very odd to regard each rung on the
career ladder as a different employment relation.
Id.
72. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2395 (1989)(Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
73. 719 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
74. 1& at 555.
75. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377 (1989).
76. Id. at 2378.
77. Id
78. Id
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mate non-discriminatory reasons were in fact pretextual.79 The
instruction in Patterson failed to list any of those other methods or to
give the jury the opportunity to consider evidence relating to those
other methods. Therefore, the Court concluded that the instruction
was erroneous.
E. The Relationship Between Section 1981 and Title VH
The Court's narrow interpretation of section 1981 in Patterson
could have a substantial impact on civil rights litigation. The majority
in Patterson, however, apparently felt that section 1981 was unneces-
sary in light of Title VII80 and that section 1981 interfered with Title
VII's strict procedures designed to reduce litigation through concilia-
tion.8 ' The majority assumed that the two statutes are interchangea-
ble. However, as Justice Brennan noted in' his dissent, there are
several substantive differences between section 1981 and Title VII.
First, section 1981 covers all contracts while Title VII only covers em-
ployment discrimination.8 2 Also, Title VII only covers employment
discrimination in businesses with more that 15 employees.8 3 Accord-
ing to one study, the 15 employee limitation excludes 15% of the
workforce from coverage under Title VII.84 This 15% of the
workforce would be covered under section 1981 which applies to all
contracts. Section 1981, unlike Title VII, provides a right to a jury
trial.8 5 Title VII limits damages to backpay and possible injunctive re-
lief while compensatory and punitive damages can be recovered under
section 1981.86 In addition, Title VII has a two year limit on backpay
but section 1981 has no statutory limit; in a section 1981 claim the stat-
ute of limitations is usually "the most appropriate one provided by
state law."8 7 Finally, possibly the most important difference between
79. "For example, petitioner could... present evidence of respondent's past treat-
ment of petitioner, including the instances of the racial harassment which she
alleges and respondent's failure to train her for an accounting position." Id. at
2378.
80. Title VII provides in relevant part-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
81. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2374-75 (1989).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
84. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 596,
602 (1988).
85. Goodman v. Lukens Steel, Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
86. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
87. 1& at 462. For a complete discussion of statute of limitations considerations under
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the two statutes is that section 1981 allows an employee to bring suit
without having to follow the strict procedures of Title VII.88
When the procedural requirements of Title VII are considered it
becomes apparent that they can create a trap for an unsuspecting or
uninformed employee. The first requirement under Title VII is that
within the appropriate time frame the employee alleging discrimina-
tion must file a charge of discrimination in writing and under oath
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").89
In a state without a local or state antidiscrimination agency, the
charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act.90 In a state with a state or local agency the employee must first
file with the state, and the time limit for filing with the EEOC is ex-
tended to 300 days or 30 days after the employee receives notice that
the state or local agency has terminated its proceedings.91 After the
employee properly files a charge, the EEOC is required to serve a no-
tice of the charge on the employer.9 2 After the notice is given, the
EEOC must investigate the charge to determine whether there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that it is true.9 3 If the EEOC makes a deter-
mination of reasonable cause it is required to attempt to work out a
conciliation agreement between the parties. If the parties cannot
reach an acceptable agreement within 30 days after the conciliation
process begins, the EEOC will terminate the proceedings. The EEOC
can terminate the proceedings earlier if the employer refuses to con-
ciliate or to make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute.94
Once the conciliation proceedings are completed and an agreement
has not been reached the EEOC may bring a civil suit in federal court
on behalf of the employee.9 5 If the EEOC does not bring a civil action
within 180 days it is required to issue the employee a right to sue let-
ter. The employee is then required to file a suit in federal court within
90 days of receiving the right to sue letter. If the employee fails to file
suit within 90 days he or she will be barred from bringing any further
action under Title VII.96 The employee will similarly be denied recov-
ery if any of the other procedural requirements are not met.
§ 1981, see C. SULLIVAN, J. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDs, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.6 (1980).
88. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). See also C. SULLIVAN, J. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS,
supra note 87, at § 3.4.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
91. Id. For a general discussion of timing considerations, see C. SULLIVAN, J. ZIMMER
& R. RICHARDs, supra note 87, at § 3.4.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1982).
93. 1&
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
95. Id-
96. Id
[Vol. 69:906
RACIAL HARASSMENT
An employee bringing an action under section 1981 is not required
to follow these procedures which creates obvious advantages for the
employee. 97 Prior to Patterson, an employee who missed one of the
Title VII deadlines or who did not want to face the administrative pro-
cess could file a section 1981 claim. Following Patterson, a careless or
uninformed employee will be totally denied a remedy if the charge is
not filed within 180 days or if one of the other requirements is not
met. It is likely that the trap created by Title VII will catch many
victims of racial harassment and without section 1981 they will have
no way to escape.
One other potential ramification of Patterson should also be con-
sidered. Again, a major difference between Title VII and section 1981
is that section 1981 allows compensatory and punitive damages while
Title VII damages are limited to backpay. The fact that victims of ra-
cial harassment can no longer recover compensatory and punitive
damages creates an obvious monetary disadvantage to the victims.
However, the loss of these types of damages could have a much more
substantial impact on civil rights litigation than is readily apparent.
Because of limited governmental resources, all laws which prohibit
discrimination rely heavily on private enforcement. As a result, indi-
viduals who bring discrimination claims act not only on their own be-
half but also on behalf of society's interest in eradicating
discrimination. When all other factors are held constant and the
amount of damages are reduced, the number of plaintiffs willing to
bring discrimination claims should be reduced. Thus, it is likely that
more active discrimination will go unprosecuted and the inexpensive
enforcement scheme will be at least partially undermined.
It is also highly likely that many civil rights attorneys will refuse to
take discrimination claims on a contingency fee basis because the po-
tential for large damage awards no longer exists. Along the same
lines, it will be much more difficult for employees to convince employ-
ers to settle claims when the employer knows there is no potential for
a jury trial and large punitive damage awards. The end result is that
victims of racial harassment could be denied the benefit of competent
counsel because they cannot afford the fees and because attorneys will
be cautious about getting involved in litigation that has very limited
damage potential and very low possibility of early settlement.
V. SURVEY OF EIGHTH CIRCUIT SECTION 1981 CLAIMS
As discussed above, the differences between Title VII and section
1981 are substantial. However, the majority in Patterson may have
been correct in believing that few people will be totally denied a rem-
edy because of the limitations placed on section 1981. A study of all
97. See, ag., Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1375 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
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section 1981 cases in the Eighth Circuit in which a final judgment has
been issued since January 1, 1985 produced the following results:9 8
Total cases involving section 1981 claims .................... 53
Total cases in which plaintiff prevailed on section 1981
claim ..................................................... 3
Total cases in which section 1981 claim was made in
employment context ..................................... 50
Total cases in which section 1981 Claim was the Sole Source
of Recovery Relied Upon ................................. 10
Total cases in employment context that were not joined
with a Title VII claim .................................... 9
Again, one of the major concerns created by Patterson is that vic-
tims of racial harassment outside of the employment setting will be
denied a remedy because of the narrow interpretation of section 1981.
It is possible that this concern will be valid in the future. However,
the fact that racial harassment claims by non-employees are no longer
actionable under section 1981 would have had a very nominal impact
in the Eighth Circuit during the time frame of the survey. The survey
indicated that only 3 of the 53 section 1981 claims in the Eighth Circuit
were non-employment discrimination claims and all 3 of those claims
were unsuccessful.99 Therefore, Title VII's restriction to employment
discrimination would not have been a major factor in the Eighth Cir-
cuit because all of the successful claims were employment related.
A second statistic that must be considered when assessing the po-
tential impact of Patterson is the number of section 1981 claims that
were unaccompanied by an alternative means of recovery. This statis-
tic is important because a victim of racial harassment who brings a
section 1981 claim without also bringing another related claim may be
affected by Patterson more than an individual who has another claim
available. The survey indicated that 10 of the 53 section 1981 claims
were unaccompanied by an alternative means of recovery.10 0 There-
98. The study includes only cases that appeared in a Lexis search using various forms
of the key words section 1981 (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1981, and section 1981) and
focuses on the following issues: 1) whether the claim was successful; 2) whether
the claim was based on employment discrimination; and 3) whether the section
1981 claim was brought alone or whether alternative means of recovery were
sought. Again, only those cases where there was a final adjudication were in-
cluded in the survey.
99. See Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1988) (police misconduct claim);
Washington v. Simpson, 806 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1986)(racially motivated arrest);
Devan v. City of Des Moines, 767 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1985)(police misconduct).
100. See Tart v. Levi Strauss & Co., 864 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1988); Edwards v. Jewish
Hospital, 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988); Barfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 815 F.2d
516 (8th Cir. 1987); Wilminton v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986); Devan
v. City of Des Moines, 767 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1985); McDowell v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985); McNichols v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 697
F.Supp. 1081 (E.D. Mo. 1988); Pillow v. Schoemehl, 620 F.Supp 360 (E.D. Mo.
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fore, 43 of the persons claiming discrimination potentially would not
have been without a remedy if their section 1981 claim was denied.
Instead, they had an alternative source of recovery.
It is also important to analyze the 10 claims which were brought
individually to determine whether they were employment discrimina-
tion claims and thus potentially actionable under Title VII. The re-
sults indicate that 9 of the 10 claims were in fact employment
discrimination claims. This indicates that all but one of the section
1981 claims in the Eighth Circuit had a potential source of recovery
outside of section 1981 which is a very substantial statistic.
The survey also reveals that only three section 1981 claims were
successful during the relevant time frame. The next section discusses
the three successful claims and points out that all three successful
claims involved employment discrimination and all three could have
been brought under Title VII.101
VI. SUCCESSFUL SECTION 1981 CLAIMS
The final portion of this Note will discuss how Patterson would
have affected the three successful section 1981 claims in the Eighth
Circuit since January 1985. In Edwards v. Jewish Hospital,1 02 Wil-
liam Edwards, a black male, was terminated by Jewish Hospital after
funds were stolen from the hospital safe.1OS Edwards was asked to
submit to a polygraph test because he was among thirteen employees
who had access to the safe.'0 4 Edwards, along with three other em-
ployees, failed the polygraph examination. Edwards was then tested
two additional times and was terminated after he failed the polygraph
examination for the third time.1 05
After his termination, Edwards filed a claim under section 1981 al-
leging that he was terminated because of his race. The case was tried
before a jury. The jury in two separate special interrogatories found
that Jewish Hospital had intentionally discriminated against Edwards
but that Edwards would have been terminated regardless of his
race.1 0 6 The jury then awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages,
$5,000 backpay, and $25,000 in punitive damages. 0 7
1985); Love v. Special School Dist., 606 F.Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Perry v. City
of Country Club Hills, 607 F.Supp. 776 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
101. See Edwards v. Jewish Hosp., 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988); Wilmington v. J.I.
Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986); Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251
(8th Cir. 1985).
102. 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988).
103. Id- at 1347.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1348.
107. Id.
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The trial court, however, reduced the compensatory damages to $1
and struck the backpay award.10s The court reasoned that Edwards
would have been terminated regardless of his race so there were no
actual damages. 109 However, the trial court did allow the $25,000 puni-
tive damage award because "It]he deterrent purposes which also un-
derlie § 1981 would be thwarted in many cases if an employer were
able to avoid liability completely by showing that his intentional racial
discrimination happened in this particular instance to be
'harmless.' "110
In the majority of jurisdictions Edwards would no longer have a
valid section 1981 claim in light of Patterson because in these jurisdic-
tions discriminatory termination claims are no longer actionable
under section 1981.111 However, based on a recent United States
Supreme Court case, Edwards would have likely been unable to re-
cover damages even if his claims were still actionable under section
1981. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court stated that an em-
ployer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken
gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regard-
ing a particular person.112 This same reasoning would likely apply to
Edwards because the jury found that Edwards would have been termi-
nated regardless of his race. Therefore, it is unlikely that Patterson
would have been a factor in Edwards.
In Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co.,113 the plaintiff filed a section 1981
claim after he was terminated by Case. The claim alleged that Case's
discriminatory treatment "denied him equal opportunities for in-
creased pay, promotion, or other advancement" and that he was sub-
jected to stricter rules and terminated all because of his race.114
A jury found for Wilmington and awarded $400,000 in actual dam-
ages which included damages for pain and suffering" 5 and $40,000 in
punitive damages. 116 Once again, the major impact Patterson would
have had on Wilmington was in the amount of damages that could
have been recovered. Wilmington could have been brought under Ti-
tle VII because Case employed more than 15 people and all of Wil-
mington's claims were for employment discrimination.1 7 Thus
108. Id
109. Id- at 1349.
110. Id at 1351-52.
111. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
112. 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1786 (1989). Price Waterhouse was a Title VII claim, so it is possi-
ble, but unlikely, that the test would be applied differently when a § 1981 claim is
involved.
113. 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 913.
115. Id at 922.
116. Id. at 911.
117. Id. (Wilmington was one of thirty-five welders under his immediate supervisor)
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Wilmington could have recovered back-pay under Title VII but not
punitive damages or damages for pain and suffering. It is important to
remember, however, that the right to a jury trial does not exist under
Title VII and that the outcome of the claim and the amount of dam-
ages may have been different if decided by the court.
The final successful claim was Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.118 In
Easley, three unsuccessful job applicants alleged that Anheuser-Busch
had discriminated against them in hiring because of their race.119 The
applicants filed claims under both section 1981 and Title VII.120 The
plaintiffs did not request a jury trial on the section 1981 claim and the
court concluded that Anheuser-Busch's employment test was unfair to
black applicants and that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case of racial discrimination.121
Easley is a good example of the type of claim that is still likely to
be available under section 1981. The plaintiffs in Easley alleged that
they were not hired because of their race. Yet, even after Patterson,
this appears to be actionable under section 1981 because the alleged
discriminatory conduct centers on the failure to enter into a contract,
not on post-formation conduct.122
Based on this survey, it appears that Patterson would have had lit-
tle impact on the success of civil rights claims in the Eighth Circuit
since 1985. However, this is not to say that the holding of Patterson is
insignificant. On the contrary, Patterson will likely have a substantial
impact on civil rights litigation even if all future claims are actionable
under Title VII. Patterson makes it more difficult for employees to
file claims because of the strict filing deadlines of Title VII. The deci-
sion will decrease the chances of cases being settled because employ-
ers no longer face the threat of compensatory and punitive damages.
And finally, employees who are discriminated against will no longer
have the possibility of a jury trial and may consequently receive
smaller damage awards.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan summed up the holding in Patterson when he
stated that "what the Court declines to snatch away with one hand, it
takes with the other." 123 Although the Court upheld Runyon v. Mc-
Crary,12 4 thereby holding that section 1981 applies to private con-
tracts, the Court interpreted section 1981 so narrowly that the statute
118. 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
119. Id- at 254.
120. Id
121. I& at 256.
122. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2374 (1989).
123. Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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no longer protects racial harassment and discriminatory termination
in most jurisdictions and may only cover discriminatory promotion
claims in limited circumstances. The Court arrived at this interpreta-
tion by reasoning that section 1981 was unnecessary because Title VII
affords protection for the very same rights. A survey of section 1981
cases in the Eighth Circuit indicates that the Court may have been
correct in this reasoning. However, this does not diminish the fact
that by forcing victims of racial harassment to proceed under Title VII
the Court denies these victims the right to a jury trial and the ability
to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The end result is that
victims of racial harassment must be conscious of the strict timing re-
quirements of Title VII because they no longer have a remedy avail-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Todd A. Richardson '91"
* The author would like to thank Harvey Cooper of the law firm Abrahams, Kas-
low and Cassman, and Professor Steven Willborn for their assistance in preparing
this Note.
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